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Abstract
A univariate real-valued function is said to be completely monotone if it takes positive
values and alternate the signs of its higher order derivatives, starting from everywhere neg-
ative ﬁrst derivatives. We prove that the representative consumer’s discount factor of a
continuous-time economy under uncertainty is a power function of some completely mono-
tone function of time satisfying certain boundary conditions if and only if it may be derived
from a group of consumers having constant and equal relative risk aversion, and constant
and yet possibly unequal discount rates.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: D51, D53, D61, D81, D91, E43, G12.
Keywords: Complete monotonicity, discount factor, discount rate, representative con-
sumer, expected utility, time additivity, relative risk aversion, Bernstein’s theorem.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we are concerned with a continuous-time economy under uncertainty populated
by multiple consumers. We assume that all consumers have time-additive utility functions and
constant subjective time discount rates, although the rates may diﬀer across them. We are
interested in how the heterogeneity in discount rates aﬀects the term structure of interest rates.
As is often done in the analysis of asset pricing and eﬃcient risk sharing, we will consider
the problem of maximizing the weighted sum of individual consumers’ utilities subject to the
resource feasibility constraint. The value function of this constrained maximization problem,
as a function of aggregate consumption processes, is called the representative consumer’s utility
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1function. Since the individual consumers’ utility functions are time additive, so is the rep-
resentative consumer’s. Let us call the integrand of a consumer’s utility function his felicity
function. Our study is focused on how the heterogeneity in the individual consumers’ discount
rates aﬀects the representative consumer’s felicity function.
Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005, Proposition 5) showed that if all individual consumers’ felicity
functions exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the representative consumer’s discount
rates are decreasing with respect to time. They, moreover, showed that if there are inﬁnitely
many consumers, having some appropriately chosen utility weights, and their (constant) dis-
count rates are exponentially distributed, and if their felicity functions exhibit constant and
equal relative risk aversion (a special case of decreasing absolute aversion), then the represen-
tative consumer’s discount rate is a hyperbolic function of time (a special case of decreasing
discount rates). These results show that the representative consumer’s time preferences may
well be, both qualitatively and quantitatively, quite diﬀerent from individual consumers’ coun-
terparts when their subjective discount rates are heterogeneous. In particular, even if they
all have constant discount rates, the representative consumer would typically not. This fact
has signiﬁcant implication on asset pricing and the term structure of interest rates. It also
casts some doubt on the applicability of the standard representative-consumer model where the
representative consumer has a time-additive utility function with a constant discount rate.
In this paper, we develop the analysis of Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) further by main-
taining the assumption that all consumers have constant and equal relative risk aversion but
dispensing with the assumption that the heterogeneous discount rates are exponentially dis-
tributed. Then the representative consumer would not necessarily exhibit hyperbolic discount-
ing, and, yet, we can fully characterize the representative consumer’s discount factor. We shall
do this by proposing a sub-class, denoted by H , of completely monotone functions. An in-
ﬁnitely many times diﬀerentiable function h : R++ ! R is said to be completely monotone
if (¡1)nh(n)(t) ¸ 0 for every non-negative integer n, where h(n) is the n-th derivative of h if
n ¸ 1 and h(0) = h by convention. We will impose additional restrictions on the asymptotic
behavior of h(t) as t ! 1 and t ! 0 to deﬁne the sub-class H , and show that the representa-
tive consumer’s discount factor is a power function of some function in H (which is a function
of time but not of aggregate consumption levels) if and only if it can be derived from a group
of consumers having constant and equal constant relative risk aversion, and constant but not
necessarily equal discount rates. This result indicates what aspects of, say, the term structure
of interest rates can or cannot be accounted for by the heterogeneity of consumers’ discount
rates in models of constant and equal relative risk aversion.
In general, the representative consumer’s utility function is subordinated to the choice of
utility weights. While Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) found utility weights for the representative
consumer to exhibit hyperbolic discounting when the individual consumers’ (constant) discount
rates are exponentially distributed, they did not check whether the proﬁle of such utility weights
are the unique one or there may be other utility weights that give rise to the same discount factor
for the representative consumer. In this paper, we show that the representative consumer’s
2discount factor uniquely determines the proﬁle of individual consumers’ utility weights. This
is true not only when the individual consumers’ discount rates are exponentially distributed
(and hence the representative consumer exhibits hyperbolic discounting) but also when they
are arbitrarily distributed (and hence we only know that his discount factor is a power function
of some function in H ). Since his discount factor can be uniquely determined by the term
structure of interest rates and the utility weights are monotonically related with the wealth
shares, this results also tells us that once we observe the term structure of interest rates, we can
fully recover the wealth distribution across consumers of various (constant) discount rates. It
also allows us, in principle, to assess the plausibility of the tem structure models by comparing
the implied wealth distribution with the empirically observed one.
The mathematical fact behind these results are the celebrated theorem by S. Bernstein,
which asserts that a function is completely monotone if and only if it can be represented as an
integral of negative exponential functions, where the integral is taken over constants multiplied
to the arguments of the negative exponential functions. It is easy to check from the ﬁrst-order
conditions of a solution to the constrained maximization problem of the weighted sum of utilities
that if all consumers have constant and equal relative risk aversion, then the representative
consumer’s discount factor is a power function of some (completely monotone) function in H .
To establish the converse, we need, for any given (completely monotone) function H , to specify
the individual consumers’ utility weights. This is the step where we need Bernstein’s theorem.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the setting of the paper and gives
some preliminary results. Section 3 reviews known results on completely monotone functions
and proposes the sub-class H . Section 4 presents the main result of this paper. Section 5
concludes.
2 Setup and Preliminary Results
The economy is subject to uncertainty, which is represented by a probability measure space
(Ω;F;P). The time span is R+ = [0;1), which is of continuous time and inﬁnite length,
although it could be [0;T] with 0 < T < 1, which is of ﬁnite length. The gradual information
revelation is represented by a ﬁltration (Ft)t2R+. There is only one type of good on each time
and state.1
We allow the number of consumers present in the economy to be ﬁnite and inﬁnite. Formally,
we let (A;A ;º) be a ﬁnite measure space of (names of) consumers. If A is a ﬁnite set, A is the
power set of A, and º is the counting measure on A, then the consumption sector consists of
ﬁnitely many consumers. If, on the other hand, A is the unit interval [0;1], A is the Borel ¾-ﬁeld
B([0;1]), and º is (the restriction of) the Lebesgue measure on B([0;1]), then the consumption
sector consists of inﬁnitely many consumers, each of whom is negligible in size relative to the
1Just as the analysis of Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005), the subsequent analysis would still be valid even in
the absence of uncertainty. Although we could simplify our model by restricting our attention to a deterministic
economy, we have chosen to incorporate uncertainty to make our model immediately applicable to asset pricing
theory.
3total population of the economy. For each B 2 A , º(B) is the proportion of the consumers
belonging to B in the entire consumption sector.
We assume that the consumers have time-additive utility functions over consumption pro-
cesses, which exhibit constant and equal relative risk aversion, and constant but possibly unequal
discount rates. Formally, let ¯ > 0 and u : R++ ! R satisfy u0(x) = x¡¯ for every x 2 R++.
Let ½ : A ! R++ be measurable, where R++ is endowed with the Borel ¾-ﬁeld B (R++). Then








where ca = (ca
t)t2R+.2;3
To ﬁnd a Pareto eﬃcient allocation of a given aggregate consumption process c = (ct)t2R+
and its supporting (decentralizing) state-price deﬂator, it is suﬃcient to let ¸ : A ! R++ be a
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where ¹ is the Lebesgue measure. The constraint,
R
A ca dº(a) = c, is, of course, separable across
time and states. To ﬁnd the solution to the constrained maximization problem, therefore, it
suﬃces to denote by I the set of all integrable functions deﬁned on A and taking values in
2This and other integrals in the subsequent analysis need not be well deﬁned without no additional assumptions
on c
a and other stochastic processes. But the subsequent argument depends only on the ﬁrst-order conditions
of (utility or social welfare) maximization problems, which must necessarily hold whenever there is a solution to
the problem under consideration. We shall therefore be implicit about these additional assumptions.
3Although the assumption of constant and equal relative risk aversion is quite stringent, there are good reasons
to restrict our attention to this case. First, this assumption allows us to compare our results with the result in
Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) on the representative consumer’s hyperbolic discounting, as the latter uses the
same assumption. Second, under this assumption, if all consumers had the same (constant) discount rate, then
the representative consumer would have the same constant relative risk aversion and the same (constant) discount
rate as the individual consumers. Hence any anomalies in the representative consumer’s discount rate can be












for every (x;t) 2 R++ £ R+.
If there is a solution to (1), it must be essentially unique with respect to º because u is
strictly concave. Assuming its existence, we denote the unique solution by f(x;t) 2 I and













This shows that the mutual fund theorem holds at each time t across states, but not across
time, because the consumption share (·(t))
¡1 (¸(a)exp(¡½(a)t))
1=¯ depends on t unless ½ is an
essentially constant function of a, that is, all consumers’ discount rates are equal.



























for every t 2 R+. The function d : R+ ! R is the representative consumer’s discount factor.
Note that in order for v (and, thus, U) to be well deﬁned, it is necessary that h(0) < 1. This
is equivalent to saying that the function a 7! (¸(a))1=¯ is integrable with respect to º.










for every t 2 R+. Thus the representative consumer’s impatience r is his continuously com-
pounded instantaneous subjective discount rate as a function of time. Unlike the case of indi-
vidual consumers, this is not constant but varies with t unless all individual consumers have






Hence, to identify how the discount rate r depends on time t, it is suﬃcient to identify how
¡h0(t)=h(t) varies with t.
The representative consumer is useful to identify asset prices, because his marginal utility
process, (@v(ct;t)=@x)t2R+, serves as a state price process. This means that the price at time
t, relative to the current consumption, of an asset with dividend (rate) process ± = (±t)t2R+ is









Moreover, although we analyze the Pareto eﬃcient allocations, if the asset markets are complete,
then our analysis is applicable to the equilibrium allocations and asset prices. This is because
the ﬁrst welfare theorem holds in complete markets, so that the equilibrium allocations are
Pareto eﬃcient and the equilibrium asset prices are given by the marginal utility process. Since
u is concave, the second welfare theorem also holds, so that every Pareto eﬃcient allocation
is an equilibrium allocation for some distribution of initial endowments. Hence an analysis of
Pareto eﬃcient allocations is also an analysis of equilibrium allocations.
Our ﬁndings in this section can be summarized as follows. First, the representative con-
sumer’s felicity function v is multiplicatively separable between time t and consumption level
x. Second, it has constant relative risk aversion ¯, just as the individual consumers. Third, the
























Thus, in view of this, knowing the properties of function h is useful to identify asset prices. In
the rest of this paper, we shall explore such properties by making use of the fact that h is a
completely monotone function of t.
3 Complete Monotonicity
A function h : R++ ! R is completely monotone if it is inﬁnitely many times diﬀerentiable
and (¡1)nh(n)(t) ¸ 0 for every non-negative integer n and every t 2 R+, where h(n) is the n-th
derivative of h if n ¸ 1 and h(0) = h. In this section, we propose a sub-class of completely mono-
tone functions that satisfy some boundary conditions which will later turn out to characterize
the representative consumer’s discount factor.
We start with presenting a well known characterization of completely monotone functions.
Feller (1966, Chapter XIII, Section 4) and Billingsley (1995, Chapter 4, Section 22) are standard
references on this topic.
6Theorem 1 (Bernstein) For every completely monotone function h, there exist a unique





for every t 2 R++. Moreover, ¹(Q) < 1 for every bounded interval Q ½ R+.





for every n and t. This shows that if ¹ is concentrated on 0, then h is a constant function,
but otherwise, (¡1)nh(n)(t) > 0 for every non-negative integer n and every t 2 R++. In this
case, we put on record the following result, which will be used to analyze the representative
consumer’s impatience.










for every non-negative integer n and every t 2 R++. The weak inequality holds as an equality
if and only if ¹ is concentrated on a single point of R++.

























and that the weak inequality holds as an equality if and only if ¹ is concentrated on a single
point of R++. To do so, let ¹t be the Borel measure on R+ of which the Radon-Nikodym





the n-th power function qn is integrable with respect to ¹t for every non-negative integer n.






























Here the weak inequality holds as an equality if ¹, and hence ¹t, is degenerated is degenerated
on a single point, in which case h is a negative exponential function. Otherwise, it holds as a
strict inequality because the two functions q 7! q(n+2)=2 and q 7! qn=2 are not scalar multiples
of each other on any set on which ¹t takes full measure. ///
The following proposition speciﬁes the class of completely monotone functions that may
arise as the representative consumer’s discount factor. It is, in essence, stated in Feller (1966,
Chapter XIII, Section 4). We omit the proof.
Proposition 2 For every function h : R++ ! R, the following two conditions are equivalent.





h(t) < 1: (9)





for every t 2 R++.
Moreover, then, such a ¹ is unique.
Since every completely monotone function is non-increasing, (9) means that h(t) ! 0 as t ! 1,
and h(t) converges to some ﬁnite number as t ! 0. We denote the set of all functions satisfying
either (and hence both) of these two properties by H . Below are some examples of completely
monotone functions.
Example 1 1. Let h(t) = 1=(t+1), then h 2 H . Indeed, let ¹ be the probability measure on
R+ of which the density function (Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to the Lebesgue




0 exp(¡qt)exp(¡q)dq for every t.
82. Let h(t) = 1=t, then h is completely monotone but does not belong to H . Indeed, let ¹





every t, and ¹ is not ﬁnite.
3. Let h(t) = (t + 2)=(2t + 2), then h is completely monotone but does not belong to H .
Indeed, let ¹ac be the ﬁnite measure on R+ of which the density function (Radon-Nikodym
derivative with respect to the Lebesgue measure) g : R+ ! R+ is deﬁned by g(q) =
(1=2)exp(¡q); ¹s be the ﬁnite measure putting measure 1=2 on f0g and zero everywhere
else; and ¹ = ¹ac + ¹s. Then h(t) =
R
R+ exp(¡qt)d¹(q), and ¹ is not concentrated on
R++.
4 Representative Consumer’s Discount Factor
In this section, we fully characterize the representative consumer’s discount factor by the subset
H of completely monotone functions. First, we show that for any distribution of the individual
consumers’ discount rates and utility weight, the representative consumer’s discount factor is a
power function of some function in H .
Proposition 3 If the function a 7! (¸(a))1=¯ is integrable with respect to º and if h : R++ ! R
is deﬁned by (5), then h 2 H .
Proof of Proposition 3 By Proposition 2, it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd a ﬁnite Borel measure ¹
on R++ for which (8) holds. To do so, denote by B the sub-¾-ﬁeld of A generated by ½.
Since a 7! (¸(a))1=¯ is integrable, deﬁne a function ¯ ¸ : A ! R++ so that a 7!
¡¯ ¸(a)
¢1=¯ is (a
version of) the conditional expectation of a 7! (¸(a))
1=¯ given B. This means, in symbol, that




. Since a 7! exp(¡½(a)t=¯) is measurable with respect to B, Theorem 34.3





















We see that the two functions deﬁning utility weights, ¸ and ¯ ¸, give rise to the same discount
factor. By Theorem 20.1 of Billingsley (1995), there exists a measurable function g : R++ !
















for every t 2 R+. By a slight abuse of notation, we also denote by ¯ the function of multiplying



























± ¯ is the function q 7! (g(¯q))
1=¯. Then (8) holds. Moreover, the function
q 7! (g(¯q))










and the function a 7! (¯ ¸(a))1=¯ is integrable with respect to º. This means that ¹ is ﬁnite. ///
An important corollary of Proposition 3 is that r is a strictly decreasing function of time
unless all consumers have the same discount rate.
Corollary 1 For every t 2 R+, r0(t) · 0. The weak inequality holds as an equality if and only
if º ± ½¡1 is concentrated on a single point in R++.













is concentrated on a single point in R++. By (6) and the deﬁnition of ¯, this is equivalent to
saying that r0(t) = 0 if and only if º ± ½¡1 is concentrated on a single point in R++. ///
The following proposition is the main result of this paper, and establishes the converse of
Proposition 3. It implies that we can recover the function ½ deﬁning utility weights from h. As
in the proof of Proposition 3, for a ¯ > 0, we also use ¯ to denote the function of multiplying
¯, that is, ¯(q) = ¯q for every q 2 R.
Proposition 4 Let º, ½, and ¯ be as deﬁned in Section 2. Let h 2 H . Let ¹ be the unique Borel
measure on R++ that satisﬁes (8). Then ¹ and
¡
º ± ½¡1¢
±¯ are mutually absolutely continuous
if and only if there exists a measurable function ¸ : A ! R++ such that a 7! (¸(a))
1=¯ is
integrable with respect to º and (5) holds. Moreover, then, there is an essentially unique ¸, with
respect to ¹ and
¡
º ± ½¡1¢
±¯, that satisﬁes (5) and is measurable with respect to the sub-¾-ﬁeld
generated by ½.
Roughly speaking, this proposition tells us that if we assume that all consumers have equal
and constant relative risk aversion and constant but not necessarily equal discount rates, and,
in addition, if we know the representative consumer’s impatience, then we can fully recover
the utility weights given to each discount rate in the welfare maximization problem (1). Put
diﬀerently, imagine that a given set of data regarding the individual consumers’ portfolio choices
justiﬁes the assumption that all consumers have constant and equal relative risk aversion. By
observing the equity premium (the diﬀerence between the risk-free interest rate and the expected
rate of return on the market portfolio), we can ﬁgure out the level ¯ of the constant relative risk
aversion. By observing the term structure of interest rates, we can ﬁgure out the representative
consumer’s discount factor d = (d(t))t2R+. We can then calculate h = (h(t))t2R+ via h(t) =
(d(t))
1=¯. Then, by Proposition 4, we can completely recover the utility weight given to each
discount rate. Since the utility weights are monotonically related with the wealth shares, this
10means that once we observe the bond prices, we can recover the wealth distribution among
consumers of various discount rates.
Two more remarks on Proposition 4 are in order. First, by claiming that a function ¸




mutually absolutely continuous, it shows that the representative consumer’s discount factor tells
us which discount rates are or are not held by individual consumers in the economy. Second,
the proposition only claims the function ¸ specifying utility weight is unique among those which
are measurable with respect to the sub-¾-ﬁeld generated by the function ½ specifying discount
rates. In fact, although we can fully recover utility weights given to each group of consumers
of the same discount rate, we can in no way identify how the weights are distributed among
consumers in any such group. This is because the mutual fund theorem holds within each
such group and the distribution of utility weights within it does not aﬀect the representative
consumer’s discount factor.
Proof of Proposition 4 Suppose ﬁrst that there exists a measurable function ¸ : A ! R++
such that a 7! (¸(a))
1=¯ is integrable and (5) holds. Deﬁne ¯ ¸ and g as in the proof of Proposition
3, then we obtain (13). This and (8) together imply that the Borel measure ¹ coincides with the




is the function q 7! (g(¯q))
1=¯. To establish mutual absolute continuity, it remains to prove







± ¯ = º ±
¡
¯¡1 ± ½
¢¡1, this measure puts probability zero outside the
set f½(a)=¯ 2 R++ j a 2 Ag. But, for every q = ½(a)=¯ in this set, g(¯q) = ¯ ¸(a) > 0
because ¸ takes strictly positive values and ¯ ¸ is its conditional expectation. Thus the function
q 7! (g(¯q))




Suppose conversely that ¹ and
¡
º ± ½¡1¢








takes strictly positive values almost surely.










for every a 2 A. Then ¸ takes strictly positive values almost surely with respect to º, because
the Radon-Nikodym derivative takes strictly positive values almost everywhere on f½(a)=¯ 2









































11Since ¹(R++) < 1, this shows that a 7! (¸(a))




















































To establish the uniqueness of ¸ among those measurable with respect to the sub-¾-ﬁeld
generated by ½, note from the ﬁrst paragraph of this proof that since the Radon-Nikodym
derivative is essentially unique, the function q 7! (g(¯q))
1=¯ is essentially unique with respect to
¡
º ± ½¡1¢
±¯, even when ¸ need not be measurable with respect to the sub-¾-ﬁeld generated by
½. This means that the function s 7! g(s=¯) is essentially unique with respect to the measure
º ±½¡1. Thus the function a 7! g(½(a)=¯) is essentially unique with respect to º. Thus ¯ ¸ is also




± ¯, that satisﬁes (5) and is measurable with respect to the sub-¾-ﬁeld generated
by ½. ///
Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005, Section IV) showed that if º±½¡1 is exponentially distributed,
then r may be a hyperbolic function. This result shows that hyperbolic discounting may emerge
as a consequence of heterogeneous discount rates, even when they are constant for each con-
sumer. The above proposition gives a full characterization of the representative consumer’s
discount factor when º ± ½¡1 need not be exponentially distributed.
5 Conclusion
We have proved that if all individual consumers have constant and equal relative risk aver-
sion, and constant but not necessarily equal discount rates, then the representative consumer’s
discount factor is a power function of some completely monotone function satisfying certain
boundary conditions; and that, conversely, any such function can be derived as the representa-
tive consumer’s discount factor from a group of consumers having constant and equal relative
risk aversion, and constant but not necessarily equal discount rates. We have also shown that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the distribution of utility weights deﬁning the
representative consumer and his discount factor.
While we have obtained a full characterization of the representative consumer’s discount
factor in the case where all individual consumers have constant and equal relative risk aversion,
we have not obtained any characterization of his impatience (discount rates). To do so, we need
to ﬁnd an equivalent condition, in terms of r, for h to be completely monotone when r is deﬁned
from h via (6). It is important to ﬁnd such an equivalent condition, because it will tell us which
12one of the often used models of the term structure of interest rates, presented, for example, in
Duﬃe (2001, Section 7), can be justiﬁed by the presence of heterogeneous discount rates.
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